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Decided and Entered: December 08, 2022
Before: Gische, J.P., Kern, Gesmer, Scarpulla, Rodriguez, JJ.
Index No. 160420/21 Appeal No. 16493 Case No. 202201973
[*1]K.E. Liggett, PlaintiffRespondent,
v
Lew Realty LLC, DefendantAppellant.

Borah, Goldstein, Altschuler, Nahins & Goidel, P.C., New York (Paul N. Gruber of
counsel), for appellant.
Newman Ferrara LLP, New York (Roger A. Sachar of counsel), for respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Paul A. Goetz, J.), entered on or about April
8, 2022, which denied defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, reversed, on the law,
without costs, the motion is granted and the complaint dismissed.
Plaintiff, the current tenant of the subject apartment, commenced this action seeking a
declaration that her tenancy is subject to the Rent Stabilization Law (RSL) and that the
premises were illegally decontrolled in 2000 when defendant owner and nonparty Edward
McKinney reached a "private agreement" circumventing initial rent registration procedures
for decontrolling the apartment.

The private agreement that plaintiff refers to is a March 9, 2000 stipulation executed by
defendant and McKinney settling the licensee holdover proceeding that defendant
commenced against McKinney after Edward Brown, the former rent controlled tenant of the
premises, died.
Pursuant to the 2000 stipulation, which was soordered by Civil Court, defendant and
McKinney agreed that the apartment was no longer subject to rent control, but rather rent
stabilized. They stipulated that the initial legal regulated rent for the apartment would be
$1,650 per month. Defendant agreed to offer and McKinney agreed to accept a twoyear rent
stabilized lease. They also agreed that McKinney would pay, and defendant would accept,
the lower preferential rent of $650 per month, plus allowable renewal increases. The
preferential rent would remain in effect for as long as McKinney remained the tenant and did
not challenge the rent. Those further terms were set forth in a rider to the lease. After
McKinney accepted and signed the lease, defendant filed it with DHCR, attaching the so
ordered stipulation, the lease rider and proof it had mailed the entire package to McKinney,
along with a Notice of Initial Rent.
An agreement by a tenant to waive the benefit of any provision of the rent control law is
expressly prohibited and void (9 NYCRR 2200.15; Grasso v Matarazzo, 180 Misc 2d 686,
687 [App Term, 2d Dept 1999]). However, when McKinney and defendant settled their
dispute over McKinney's status, McKinney was not a tenant (Kent v Bedford Apts. Co., 237
AD2d 140 [1st Dept 1997])[FN1]. He was not on the lease and had no evident rights, other
than being an occupant of the apartment who claimed that he had succession rights when
Brown died.[FN2] Defendant, on the other hand, denied that McKinney was anything other
than a squatter/licensee or possible roommate of the deceased. By entering into the 2000
stipulation, both sides, represented by counsel, resolved their dispute as to whether
McKinney had any statutory right to the apartment. By doing so, McKinney and defendant
chose the certainty of settlement, rather than the uncertainty of a judicial declaration about
McKinney's status (Kent at 140). There is no public policy for disregarding that choice (id.).
What plaintiff now seeks to do is step into McKinney's shoes and assert rights that she
claims McKinney [*2]had when he agreed to the terms of the 2000 stipulation, but waived.
She claims that the 2000 stipulation is little more than a "sweetheart deal" that allowed
defendant to circumvent the usual procedures attendant to decontrol and initial rent setting.
There is, however, no factual basis for plaintiff's challenge based on McKinney having
Braschi rights some 20 years ago (see Braschi v Stahl Assocs. Co., 74 NY2d 201 [1989]).

Although plaintiff contends this is not a fair market rent case, she raises arguments
implicating the issue of how rents are set. When a rentcontrolled apartment becomes vacant,
it becomes subject to the rent stabilization regime and the first rent is a market rent.
Accordingly, once Brown vacated the apartment, it was no longer subject to rent control. At
that point the first tenancy was subject to the RSL, which is what defendant and McKinney
agreed to in the 2000 stipulation. Defendant was also obligated to provide McKinney with
notice in writing by certified mail reciting of the initial legal regulated rent for the apartment
and informing him that he had a right to file for an application for adjustment of the initial
legal regulated rent within 90 days of the certified mailing (9 NYCRR 2523.1; Matter of
Park v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 150 AD3d 105 [1st Dept 2017],
lv denied 30 NY3d 961 [2017]). Regardless of any waiver, no Fair Market Rent Appeal
(FMRA) was timely filed. Instead, defendant and McKinney settled their disputes in a
pending holdover proceeding. Furthermore, where a FMRA is filed four years or more after
the first date the housing accommodation is no longer subject to rent control, the application
"shall be dismissed" as untimely (9 NYCRR 2522.3[c], 2523.1; Matter of Park, 150 AD3d at
113114; see also 200 Haven Owner, LLC v Drachman, 73 Misc 3d 1207[A] [Civ Ct, NY
County 2021]]. While in certain circumstances the right to file an FMRA may pass on to the
next tenant to occupy the apartment, those circumstances (improper notice to the first tenant,
or evidence of fraud), are not present here (Matter of Park, 150 AD3d at 114). The time to
challenge the initial legal regulated rent has long expired. Moreover, there are no allegations
that a FMRA would have been successful in proving that the first stabilized rent exceeded the
market value.
Inasmuch as no FMRA was timely filed, and the time to do so has expired, plaintiff is
no longer able to challenge the $1,650 initial legal regulated rent defendant and McKinney
agreed to in their soordered 2000 stipulation. Further arguments by plaintiff, that the actual
legal rent eligible for board guideline increases is the preferential rent, not the legal rent, are
unavailing. A preferential rent is the amount of rent charged to and paid by the tenant that is
less than the legal regulated rent for the housing accommodation (9 NYCRR 2521.2). Here,
despite the dissent's contention, the stipulation in the record clearly shows that both parties
agreed [*3]that $650 was the preferential rent, but $1,650 was the legal rent that was subject
to applicable guidelines increases and other increases authorized by law.[FN3] The
stipulation, together with the lease and notice of initial rent, was then registered. And, the
legal rent was registered and paid each year until the high rent vacancy threshold was
reached.

The claim for violation of Real Property Law § 226c should have been dismissed
because documentary evidence establishes that defendant met the notice requirements of the
provision. In any event, nothing suggests that the legislature intended a private right of action
under the statute (see Konkur v Utica Academy of Science Charter Sch., 38 NY3d 38, 4041
[2022]).
All concur except Gesmer, J. and Rodriguez, J. who dissent in a memorandum by
Gesmer J. as follows:
Gesmer, J. (Dissenting)
I respectfully dissent from the portion of the majority's decision that grants defendant's
motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim that her apartment is subject to the Rent Stabilization Law.
As set forth below, I find that defendant did not meet its burden on its preanswer motion to
dismiss to demonstrate either that there is documentary evidence disposing of plaintiff's
claims, or that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action. Rather, I would find that plaintiff has
sufficiently pleaded that the stipulation that McKinney and defendant executed in 2000 (the
2000 stipulation) was void under applicable statutes, as interpreted by our Court and the
Court of Appeals. Accordingly, I would vote to affirm the portion of the motion court's
decision that denied defendant's motion to dismiss the first, third and fourth causes of action.
[FN4]

The 2000 stipulation undermined the statutory process by which initial regulated rents
are set. The Rent Stabilization Code provides that where, as here, a formerly rent controlled
apartment is vacated and becomes subject to rent stabilization, "the initial legal regulated rent
shall be the rent agreed to by the owner and the tenant and reserved in a [rentstabilized]
lease," subject to the tenant's right to pursue a Fair Market Rent Appeal (FMRA) (9 NYCRR
2521.1[a][1]). Thus, the process has three components: the landlord sets the rent, the tenant
agrees to pay it, and, if the tenant is unhappy with the amount, the tenant has the right to
challenge the rent through a FMRA, which will be decided by the Division of Housing and
Community Renewal, subject to court review.
Of these components, only the first was present here, in that the landlord set the legal
regulated rent at $1,650. The second component was not present, since tenant did not agree to
pay that amount; rather, the tenant agreed to pay only $650 per month, plus Rent Guideline
Board increases on that amount, for the duration of his tenancy. The landlord's agreement to
that preferential rent for the tenant's entire tenancy caused the tenant to have no incentive to

challenge the legal regulated rent. But the 2000 stipulation [*4]went beyond just removing
the tenant's incentive to exercise his statutory right. Rather, in the 2000 stipulation, the tenant
affirmatively agreed not to exercise his right to challenge the rent through a FMRA, thus
removing the crucial third component for properly setting the initial legal regulated rent.
This sequence of events had two legal implications. First, McKinney's waiver of his
right to bring a FMRA is void as a waiver of his rent stabilization rights (9 NYCRR 2520.13;
9 NYCRR 2521.1[a][1]). Second, McKinney and defendant virtually ensured that the
apartment would be deregulated when McKinney vacated, because the application to the
illegal rent of vacancy increase and high rent vacancy decontrol in effect at that time would
cause the apartment to be deregulated. This is exactly what occurred. This also constituted an
impermissible waiver of rent stabilization rights (Drucker v Mauro, 30 AD3d 37, 38 [1st
Dept 2006], lv dismissed 7 NY3d 844 [2006]).
In Drucker, we held that a provision in a stipulation that violates the Rent Stabilization
Law is void, even when it is beneficial to the tenant.[FN5] We should apply the same principle
here and find that the 2000 stipulation, though beneficial for Mr. McKinney, is void. Our
holding in Drucker was based in large part on this Court's recognition that "[t]he pervasive
policy of the [Rent Stabilization Law] is to provide an adequate supply of affordable housing
in the City of New York. . . . Central to the statutory scheme is preventing the exaction of
excessive rents by landlords" (id. at 40 [citations omitted]). Accordingly, we held that an
agreement to an artificially enhanced rent that may not harm the parties can nevertheless
adversely affect future tenants, including by "subject[ing] the premises to luxury decontrol"
(id.), and is therefore illegal. That is what occurred here.
As we said almost 20 years ago, "[t]he initial stabilized rent is. . . of crucial importance
because it establishes the base on which all subsequent lawful stabilized rents are determined.
"To protect against rentgouging by landlords and to insure that stabilized rents do not
exceed fairmarket levels, the apartment's initial [rent stabilized] rent is made subject to the
tenant's right to challenge that rent in an FMRA" (Matter of Verbalis v New York State Div. of
Hous. and Community Renewal, 1 AD3d 101, 102 [1st Dept 2003]).
Here, McKinney and defendant agreed to an initial legal regulated rent that was one
vacancy increase away from high rent decontrol, and which McKinney would never have to
pay and agreed never to challenge. By doing so, they thwarted the Rent Stabilization Code's
mechanism for ensuring a fair and reasonable initial legal regulated rent: a true arm's length

negotiation in which the tenant has both the right and the incentive to challenge the initial
legal regulated rent if it were unreasonable. "Agreements like the one at issue here distort the
market without benefitting the people the rent [*5]stabilization laws were designed to
protect" (Riverside Syndicate, Inc. v Munroe, 10 NY3d 18, 23 [2008]).
The majority asserts that plaintiff fails to allege that the first rentstabilized rent
exceeded fair market value. This is incorrect. Plaintiff correctly argues in her complaint, to
the motion court and to this Court, that the only rent that the landlord proposed and
McKinney agreed to pay was $650 per month, that this sum was the only rent subject to the
arm's length negotiation contemplated by the Rent Stabilization Code to establish fair market
value, and that it should therefore have been registered as the initial legal regulated rent.
Defendant made two arguments to the motion court in support of its motion to dismiss
the action, which the motion court properly rejected. First, it argued that plaintiff's claims
were untimely. However, contrary to defendant's characterization, plaintiff does not challenge
the fair market rent, but rather, the purported deregulated status of the apartment, to which no
limitations period applies [FN6] (see Matter of Kostic v New York State Div. of Hous. &
Community Renewal, 188 AD3d 569, 569 [1st Dept 2020]; Gersten v 56 7th Ave. LLC, 88
AD3d 189, 200201 [1st Dept 2011]; see also Riverside Syndicate, Inc., 10 NY3d at 24 [a
statute of limitations "does not make an agreement that was void at its inception valid by the
mere passage of time"]).
Second, defendant argued that the apartment was lawfully deregulated under the high
rent vacancy decontrol provision in place in 20012003, by adding on the permissible rental
adjustments for alleged improvements and statutory vacancy allowances. However,
defendant's claim is only valid if the "initial legal regulated rent" set forth in the 2000
stipulation was a lawful rent. For the reasons set forth above, I would find that plaintiff has
sufficiently pleaded that it is not.
The majority states incorrectly that plaintiff argues that the 2000 stipulation was
unlawful because McKinney impermissibly waived his right to succeed to a rent controlled
tenancy when he signed the 2000 stipulation. However, this is a misstatement of plaintiff's
claim. Plaintiff did not make this claim in her complaint, in opposition to defendant's motion
to dismiss, or on this appeal. In fact, it is defendant who raises this claim for the first time on
appeal.[FN7]
Rather, plaintiff argues that when Mr. McKinney signed the 2000 stipulation, he

impermissibly waived rent stabilization protections both for himself and for future tenants
because he agreed to an "initial legal regulated rent" of $1,650 that he would never have to
pay, he agreed never to challenge that rent, and he had no incentive to challenge it as a result
of the promised permanent preferential rent of $650.
Defendant and my colleagues contend that McKinney could not have waived any rent
stabilization rights when he signed the 2000 stipulation because he was not then a tenant,
citing Kent v Bedford Apts. (237 AD2d 140 [1st Dept 1997[*6]]). However, the Court of
Appeals implicitly overruled Kent in Jazilek v Abart Holdings, LLC (10 NY3d 943 [2008],
supra). In Jazilek, the parties had resolved an earlier holdover proceeding with a stipulation
providing that the respondent (described variously as an illegal subtenant or roommate of a
primary tenant who had vacated the rentstabilized apartment), would become the primary
tenant at an agreed upon rent. Mr. Jazilek then signed a market rate lease, but later
commenced an action seeking a declaration that he was a rentstabilized tenant. The motion
court denied the landlord's motion to dismiss, and the landlord appealed. Citing Kent, this
Court reversed, determining that the stipulation was not void as an impermissible waiver of
rent stabilization rights, since Mr. Jazilek had no legal status as a tenant when he entered into
the stipulation (Jazilek, 41 AD3d 124, 125 [1st Dept 2007]). The Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that it did not matter that Jazilek was not a tenant "of record" when he entered into
the stipulation. Since the terms of the stipulation impermissibly waived rent stabilization
rights, the Court of Appeals held that the stipulation was void (Jazilek, 10 NY3d at 944; see
also 9 NYCRR 2520.13).[FN8]
Similarly, this Court has previously noted in Matter of Missionary Sisters of Sacred
Heart, Ill. v New York State Div. of Hous. and Community Renewal that the Rent Stabilization
Law was enacted, inter alia, to "prevent the exaction of 'unjust, unreasonable and oppressive
rents' and to 'forestall profiteering, speculation and other disruptive practices' in the housing
market" (283 AD2d 284, 287 [1st Dept 2001] [citations omitted]; see also Administrative
Code of City of NY § 26501). Defendant cites Missionary Sisters for the proposition that it
was permissible under the applicable law in 2000 to charge a tenant a preferential rent.
However, that case did not involve a tenant who agreed to an initial legal regulated rent that
would never apply to him, which he agreed never to challenge, and that would only serve to
deregulate the apartment upon his departure.
Furthermore, even if Kent were still good law, it is distinguishable from the facts of this
case in two respects. First, the tenant in Kent had admitted in the stipulation at issue that her
primary residence was outside of New York City (Kent v Bedford Apts. Co., 1996 WL

34574804 [Sup Ct, NY County 1996]; see also Draper v Georgia Props., Inc., 230 AD2d
455, 459 [1st Dept 1997], affd 94 NY2d 809 [1999] ["tenants [in Kent] actually were
holdover occupants who, by virtue of the stipulation, secured lease rights which they
otherwise would not have had"]). Thus, she was not entitled to a rentstabilized lease.
Second, here, the lease rider, which McKinney signed on the same day as the 2000
stipulation, contained the same provision as in the stipulation, that, despite the "initial legal
regulated" $1,650 monthly rent McKinney agreed to, "for as long as [McKinney] remains in
[*7]occupancy," he would only have to pay $650 per month plus Rent Guidelines Board
increases on that amount. Accordingly, unlike the tenant in Kent, McKinney had Rent
Stabilization rights under the lease on the same day he executed the stipulation.
Defendant's submission of documentation of alleged improvements to the apartment
after McKinney vacated do not constitute documentary evidence supporting dismissal
because the permissible increase based on those improvements alleged by defendant
($335.08) only increased the rent above the high rent vacancy amount under the law at the
time if the $1,650 figure is used as the initial legal regulated rent. Because plaintiff has
sufficiently called into question the legality of the 2000 stipulation setting that initial legal
regulated rent, I would vote to affirm the motion court's denial of defendant's motion to
dismiss on that basis.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT,
APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.
ENTERED: December 8, 2022
Footnotes
Footnote 1: We disagree with the dissent's assertion that Kent was implicitly overruled by
Jazilek v Abart Holdings, LLC (10 NY3d 943 [2008]). In any event, Jazilek is inapplicable
because it concerned a Housing Court stipulation that fixed rent at a sum in excess of the
legal limit whereas the agreement between McKinney and defendant did not.
Footnote 2: The fact that the parties disputed as to whether McKinney was entitled to
protection under rent control laws renders this case distinguishable from Drucker v Mauro
upon which the dissent relies (30 AD3d 37, 39 [1st Dept 2006], lv dismissed 7 NY3d 844
[2006]). Given the dispute, McKinney and defendant were free to enter into a stipulation
resolving whether and how the rent control laws applied to McKinney's lease, unlike in
Drucker, where it was not disputed that rent stabilization laws applied to the occupant's lease
(see 30 AD3d at 39).

Footnote 3: Although the Housing Stability & Tenant Protection Act of 2020 has
considerably changed how rents are set and increased, this action concerns events that
occurred well before the change in the law. Neither side argues that the HSTPA would
require a different result here.
Footnote 4: However, I agree with my colleagues that plaintiffs claim that defendants
violated Real Property Law § 226-c should have been dismissed.
Footnote 5: The majority attempts to distinguish Drucker from this case by claiming that "it
was not disputed that rent stabilization laws applied to the occupant's lease" in that case.
However, as discussed below, the Court of Appeals has held that a stipulation that purports to
waive rent stabilization rights is invalid regardless of the tenant's status (Jazilek v Ahart
Holdings LLC, 10 NY3d 943, 944 [2008]; see also 9 NYCRR 2520.13).
Footnote 6: For this reason, contrary to the majority's claim, plaintiff does not have to
demonstrate that an FMRA appeal (the right which McKinney had waived in any event)
would have succeeded.
Footnote 7: Defendant may have been responding to the motion court's citation of Lex &
Third 116th St Corp v Marrero (23 Misc 3d S9 [App Term 1st Dept 2000]) in the order
appealed from, even though neither party cited it in their motion papers. In Lex, a tenant was
found to have impermissibly waived the right to succeed to a rent-controlled tenancy by
entering into a rent-stabilized lease. That case has no bearing on the claim that plaintiff
actually made in her complaint.
Footnote 8: The majority attempts to distinguish Jazilek on the basis that it involved the
impermissible waiver of a different rent stabilization right than the ones at issue in this case.
However, the reasoning in Jazilek that a party to an agreement may not waive rent
stabilization rights for themselves or for future tenants, regardless of whether a party is a
tenant of record at the time they execute the agreement, is equally applicable no matter what
particular right the agreement purports to waive. Indeed, the Rent Stabilization Code does not
limit the prohibition on waivers to any particular right, but rather provides that an agreement
to waive "the benefit of any provision of the RSL or this Code is void" (9 NYCRR 2520.13
[emphasis added]).
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